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Notes
PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AS SUBSTANTIVE
EVIDENCE
In the recent case of Pulitzer v. Chapman' suit was brought in
the Circuit Court of St. Louis to contest a will on the grounds of
undue influence and fraud. The jury sustained the will, but the
Court granted a new trial, assigning as its reasons that the ver-
dict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence on the
issue as to undue influence, and that there had been error con-
cerning two instructions, neither of which is relevant to the
ensuing discussion. The question of evidence pertinent to the
issue of undue influence related to the effect of certain statements
contained in a prior deposition taken in the same case from the
will scrivener, as witness for the proponents, which statements
were inconsistent with certain of his later testimony at the trial.
These statements represented the only substantial evidence of
undue influence in the case, but they were sufficient, if admissible
as substantive proof, to sustain the order of the Circuit Court
concerning the verdict of the jury.2 After the witness had testi-
fied directly for the proponents, the contestants, during the cross-
examination, read to him the identical questions and inconsistent
answers contained in the prior deposition, and upon interroga-
tion, he admitted having made such answers to the very ques-
tions. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, it was urged
by the defendant-proponent-appellant that the above-mentioned
statements were admissible only for purposes of impeachment,
and not as substantive evidence of the facts contained, therein,
and it was contended by the plaintiff-contestant-respondent that
such statements were admissible for both purposes. The Supreme
Court, expressly negativing an intention to announce a general
I (Mo. 1935) 85 S. W. (2nd) 400.
2n Mo. where there has been an order granting a new trial because the
verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence, the appellate
court can interfere only where it finds that no verdict for the respondent
would be allowed to stand i. e. the inquiry is limited to whether there was
any substantial evidence to sustain the action of the trial court. Security
Bank of Elvins v. Nat'l Surety Co. (1933) 330 Mo. 340, 344, 62 S. W. (2nd)
'708, 709, and cases there cited.
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rule, and specifically limiting its decision to the facts of the par-
ticular case, affirmed the order granting a new trial, and re-
manded the cause, holding that prior inconsistent statements
made by a witness in a sworn deposition in the same case, and
used to impeach his testimony at the trial, may be accepted as
substantive proof of the facts involved therein, so far as they are
competent and have probative value.
This decision presents a problem of evidence which has never
been defined with particularity, nor analyzed with that acuteness
of reasoning which the solution of its intricacies demands. Those
authorities, including the Supreme Court of Missouri in the
instant case, who have been sufficiently discerning to discover the
existence of a problem, have been, unfortunately, so vague in the
description of the fundamental desideratum, and so inadequate
in the exposition of the process of solution, that both the legal
situation and the legal theories affecting it remain obscure.
The object of this article is to make an analytical dissection
of the problem and a nice scrutiny of its components, and to
present a compendium of the theories of law possibly applicable
to its solution. The scope of the discussion will embrace a com-
prehensive analysis of the law germane to prior inconsistent
statements, an examination of Professor Wigmore's theory con-
cerning such statements, a criticism of the authorities and ra-
tionale advanced in support of the result in Pulitzer v. Chapman,
and finally, certain conclusions of the writer.
I.
THE ORTHODOX RULE AND THE ELEMENTS OF NON-HEARSAY
In order to forestall any possible confusion, and to more clearly
define the thesis of this paper, let it be understood at the outset
that certain irrelevant but similar legal situations will be entirely
eliminated from the following discussion. The first of these oc-
curs when a witness makes a statement adverse to the party giv-
ing the direct examination, and such party, having been sur-
prised, then desires to prove that the witness made prior state-
ments inconsistent with his present "surprise" testimony. This
situation, at first blush, would seem to be pertinent here, but a
closer examination reveals that the true issue involves the rule
that a party cannot impeach his own witness,3 and its solution
imposes upon the rule the limitation that where a party is sur-
prised in this manner, he may prove a prior inconsistent state-
ment of "his" witness by the independent testimony of other wit-
s The principle is stated in 70 C. J. 793, "A party cannot ordinarily im-
peach a witness whom he has introduced either in a civil or a criminal
case," and cases there cited. Also see Cooper v. Armour & Co. (1929) 222
Mo. App. 1176, 15 S. W. (2nd) 946.
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nesses, even though the introduction of such testimony inci-
dentally tends to impeach the witness who gave the "surprise"
testimony upon direct examination.4 The second situation results
when a party's own prior statements are introduced by the ad-
versary. Such statements, when against interest, are, of course,
admissible as admissions against interest under a recognized
exception to the hearsay rule,5 and even irrespective of the rule
according to Professor Wigmore.sa As a corollary to this second
situation, it is equally as well established that where a witness is
identifiable as an agent of a party, and the prior inconsistent
statement is traceable to the legal scope of the agency, such state-
ment is also admissible as an admission against the party's inter-
est., The following analysis will be limited specifically to the
legal situation which is created when the cross-examining party
wishes to introduce prior inconsistent statements made by a wit-
ness who has presently testified to the contrary upon direct ex-
amination by the adversary party.
From the time of the final establishment of the Hearsay Rule
and its corollary exceptions until the publication of the second
edition of Wigmore's Evidence, in the early twentieth century,
the rule of law applicable to prior inconsistent statements re-
mained unquestioned7 A concise statement of the rule is that
"... proof of prior inconsistent statements of a witness can be
introduced and considered only for the purpose of impeachment,
and not as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter stated,
and it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury that they can
4 Ewer v. Ambrose (1825) 3 Barn. & Cr. 746, 107 Eng. Rep. 910; Wright
v. Beckett (1833) 1 Moody & R. 414, 174 Eng. Rep. 148; State v. Kohler
(1910) 228 Mo. 367, 128 S. W. 721; Dauber v. Josephson (1922) 209 Mo.
App. 531, 237 S. W. 149; Luzzadder v. McCall (Mo. App. 1917) 198 S. W.
1144; State v. Booth (1916) 186 S. W. 1019; Beier v. St. Louis Transit Co.
(1905) 192 Mo. 615, 91 S. W. 509; Dunn v. Dunnaker (1885) 87 Mo. 597;
Rhomberg v. Israel (1927) 222 Mo. App. 238, 296 S. W. 860; Deubler v.
United Rys. Co. of St. Louis (1916) 195 Mo. App. 658, 187 S. W. 813. Also
see 70 C. 3. 1028, art. 1226, and cases cited.
G See 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed.) arts. 1048-9, pp. 504-5, and refer-
ences therein.
" Ibid.
6 See 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed.) art. 1078, p. 585 et seq.:-The rule
is stated in 22 C. J. art. 440, p. 369, as follows :--"An admission of an agent
may be received in evidence against his principal, where the agent, in mak-
ing the admission, was acting within the scope of his authority, and the
transaction or negotiation to which the admission relates was pending at
the time when it was made." Kansas City v. Mastin Realty Co. (1913) 253
Mo. 619, 161 S. W. 1150; Atkinson v. American School of Osteopathy (1918)
199 Mo. App. 251, 202 S. W. 452; Koslove v. Dittmeier (Mo. App. 1918)
203 S. W. 499.
7 It is submitted that an examination of the available digests and texts
fails to elicit any authority which limits or challenges this statement. See
infra, note 8.
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consider the evidence for this purpose only, if such instruction is
requested by the party who apprehends that such proof may be
treated by the jury as substantive evidence against him."" For
the purposes of this analysis, it is significant to note that the
reason assigned, where any is given, for denying substantive
effect to prior inconsistent statements of a witness, is that if
such statements were accepted as proof of the facts stated, the
testimony would be hearsay9 With this reason as the sole basis
for the application of the rule, it is difficult to understand why
the rule was for such a long time applied automatically to all
instances of prior inconsistent statements of a witness, without
some consideration of the character of the statements. This uni-
versal error of the courts resulted, probably, from a failure to
see an inevitable implication of the rule, which is hidden in the
dogmatic language of the rule as stated, but which becomes
obvious when the rule is considered in conjunction witli the rea-
son for its application. For, if the sole objection to the introduc-
tion of prior inconsistent statements of a witness as substantive
evidence is that such statements would be hearsay, it is unequivo-
cal logic that when such statements are not hearsay, a rule of
law based entirely upon the presence of the objectionable ele-
ment, is inapplicable. Hence, it would seem to follow as an
implied corollary to the rule, that a prior inconsistent statement
of a witness which is not hearsay, or which is admissible inde-
pendently under any of the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, is
admissible as substantive proof of the facts stated therein, irre-
spective of the fact that it is also used to impeach the credibility
of the witness, or whether it impeaches the witness incidentally
by the fact of its introduction.
At this point, then, it is necessary to determine what are the
requisite elements of non-hearsay statements; that is, what are
those characteristics of statements which, if present, will prevent
the operation of the Hearsay Rule. Stated generally, these ele-
ments might be said to be:-) that the statement was made
under oath, 2) that the party adversely affected had the oppor-
8 Charlton v. Unis (1847) 4 Gratt, 60; Gould v. Norfolk Lead Co. (1855)
9 Cush. 346; see 70 C. J. art. 1339, p. 1153, and cases cited; 28 R. C. L. art.
219, p. 633; 82 Am. St. Rep. p. 39, note; 21 Ann. Cas. p. 1238; 1 Greenleaf,
Evidence (16th ed. 1899) art. 461 et seq., p. 590; 2 Wigmore, Evidence(1st ed. 1904) art. 1018 (b), p. 1180 (For Professor Wigmore's present
view contra, see infra this article, and see 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed.)
art. 1018 (b), p. 460, but see cases cited in note 1 thereto.
9Culpepper v. State (1910) 4 Old. Cr. 103, 11 Pac. 679, 31 L. R. A.(N. S.) 1166, 40 Am. St. Rep. 668, 682; Medlin v. County Bd. of Education
(1914) 167 N. C. 239, 83 S. E. 483, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 300, 302; Matter of
Moore's Will (1905) 109 App. Div. 762, 96 N. Y. Supp. 729, 733. See 70
C. J. art. 1339, p. 1153, n. 66 (b), and excerpts there presented; 2 Wigmore,
Evidence (1st ed. 1904) supra, note 8. Also see cases cited infra, note 10.
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tunity to cross-examine the declarer, and 3) that the declarer
was in court and confronting the present jury. Suppose, for the
sake of argument, that all three of these requirements must be
present to relieve a statement of the stigma of hearsay. What
effect has this upon the admissibility of prior inconsistent state-
ments of a witness?
It is submitted that there is a possible theory which would
automatically satisfy all three requirements in the great majority
of instances. As a requisite foundation for the introduction of
the prior inconsistent statements the cross-examiner must first
make known to the witness the alleged content of the statement
if oral, 10 or read it to him verbatim from the document, if writ-
ten," and question him as to whether or not he made such state-
ment.12 In most cases, and especially where the statement is
written in a produced document, the witness will admit having
made the statement. In such an event, is not the witness re-
iterating the statement in every real sense? Can there be any
sound distinction between a witness saying, "Mr. Ichthyosaurus
was a pirate,'1 21 or saying, "Yes, now that you ask me, I admit
having said that Mr. Ichthyosaurus was a pirate." The point is
that in each instance the witness has said that Mr. Ichthyosaurus
was a pirate, and, in the latter instance, he has said it under oath,
and before the present jury. Moreover, there is no necessity for
cross-examination, because the party adversely affected is the
party who gave the direct examination, and, by hypothesis,
elicited from the same witness the statement that Mr. Ichthya-
saurus was not a pirate. Why not then, in such cases where the
witness admits having made the prior inconsistent statement,
consider such statement as present evidence by what might be
termed the "theory of re-affirmation"? The only difficulty with
such a theory is that the witness is saying opposite things almost
at the same time, but since even an honest person might enter-
tain alternately conflicting convictions in re facts concerning
:0 Able v. Shields (1841) 7 Mo. 120; Clementine v. State (1851) 14 Mo.
112; State v. Davis (1860) 29 Mo. 391; State v. Curtner (1914) 262 Mo. 214,
170 S. W. 1141; State v. Sadowski (Mo. 1923) 256 S. W. 753; Rooker v.
Deering Southwestern Ry Co. (1920) 206 Mo. App. 79, 226 S. W. 69. See
70 C. J. art. 1101, p. 909, and cases there cited.
"1 State V. Stein (Mo. 1883) 79 Mo. 330; State v. Gonce (1885) 87 Mo.
627; State v. Devlin (1879) 7 Mo. App. 32; Ely-Walker Dry Goods Co. v.
Mansur (1901) 87 Mo. App. 105; State v. Elkins (1876) 63 Mo. 159; State
v. Ripley (1910) 229 Mo. 657, 129 S. W. 646; Carder v. Prinn (1892) 52 Mo.
App. 102; Also see 70 C. J. art. 1101, p. 900; 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd
ed.) arts. 1019, p. 461, and 1028, p. 475, and cases cited in n. I thereto on
pp. 475-7.
12 See references supra, notes 10 and 11.
2 The witness apparently meant that Ichthyosaurus was a marine
reptile.
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which there cannot be an objective flux, there seems to be no
good reason why such inconsistent statements should not both
be allowed to go to the jury as substantive evidence, subject to
mutual impeachment.
However, since this theory is new-born, and possibly stillborn,
let us return to our suppositious problem. If all three of the ele-
ments of non-hearsay must be present in order that a prior incon-
sistent statement be admissible as substantive proof of the facts
stated, then it is clear that if any one of the elements is absent,
the statement is hearsay, and subject to the prevailing rule that
it is admissible only for the purposes of impeachment. Thus, all
statements which were not made under oath would be hearsay.
The element of cross-examination, as above noted, may be dis-
pensed with when the consideration affects prior inconsistent
statements, because this element is only required to give the party
adversely affected the opportunity to question the witness in
regard thereto, and to attempt to detract from the detrimental
effect of the bare statement,3 et cetera, whereas here, by hypoth-
esis, the witness has already made a contradictory statement
upon direct examination at the trial: since the party in whose
favor this statement runs has the right of cross-examination con-
cerning the prior inconsistent statement, it would seem that his
right has already been satisfied more completely than if he had
exercised it originally. There remains only the element of con-
frontation to consider. No attempt will be made here to define
that term finally in its legal significance, but rather, two possible
theories thereof will be presented, and it will be demonstrated
how each one affects the problem at hand.
The first of these theories is that advanced by Professor Wig-
more, and discussed infra, which conceives of confrontation as
composed of two elements, first, and primarily, that the declarer
of a statement which is to be admitted into evidence must be
brought into court so that the party adversely affected may have
the opportunity to cross-examine him, and second, that such de-
clarer must be brought into court so that the jury may judge
of his credibility by observing his demeanor while testifying. It
is this second element which shall be considered as "confronta-
tion" for the purposes of this paper. The significance of this
conception of confrontation is that all that it requires is that a
particular witness be in court and testify. It will be at once
apparent, then, that under this definition of confrontation, a
prior inconsistent statement can never be objected to for lack
of this postulated requisite of non-hearsay, for by hypothesis the
declarer is present and testifying in court. For the purpose of
13 See 70 C. J. art. 787, p. 617, and cases cited there.
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easy reference, we shall designate this conception of confronta-
tion as the theory of general confrontation.
The second possible conception of confrontation we shall desig-
nate as the theory of specific confrontation, since its requirements
are more technical. Under this theory, which is first advanced
here, not only should the witness be present and testifying in
court, but he should make the very statement to the jury. The
supporting rationale for this theory will appear infra under the
next heading. Suffice it to designate here what effect the accep-
tance of such a theory would have upon the admissibility of prior
inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. If this more
strict requirement were imposed, then the confrontation element
could only be hurdled if the witness admitted having made the
prior inconsistent statement, for if he interposed a denial, or was
unable to remember, or in any other way failed to substantially
re-declare the statement, then under no conceivable theory could
the statement be considered non-hearsay, for even if they had
been made under oath, and in a deposition where the adversary
party had the right and opportunity of cross-examination, they
still could not be said to have been made to the present jury. In
such an event, the cross-examiner could then establish by other
witnesses that the particular witness did make the disputed state-
ments, " but this evidence would only go to the question of
whether or not the statements were made, which logically does
not in the least affect the question of whether the facts involved
in the statement are true or untrue; hence, this evidence too,
would seem to be admissible only for purposes of impeachment,
and it is so held.ab Even where the witness admitted having
made the prior statement, however, a consideration would still
remain. It seems to the writer that under this theory nothing
short of an unconditional admission would suffice. Conceding
this, two possibilities would present themselves to the tribunal:
first, to adopt the "theory of reaffirmation" and accept the state-
ments as present evidence, or second, to employ the circumlocu-
tory and fictional procedure of still speaking of the "prior incon-
sistent statements," and considering the disability of want of
confrontation as having been removed by some sort of "relation
back" doctrine.
134 Garrett v. State (1839) 6 Mo. 1; State v. Darling (1907) 202 Mo. 150,
100 S. W. 631; State v. Carter (1914) 259 Mo. 349, 168 S. W. 679; State v.
Moore (Mo. 1930) 29 S. W. (2nd) 148; State v. Taylor (1896) 136 Mo. 66,
37 S. W. 907; Courter v. Geo. W. Chase & Son Mercantile Co. (1922) 222
Mo. App. 43, 299 S. W. 622; Trauerman v. Lippincott (1890) 39 Mo. App.
478. See 70 C. J. art. 1219, p. 1011, and cases cited in n. 17 thereto. Also
see 2 Wigrnore, Evidence (2nd ed.) art. 1037, p. 488.
13b See cases supra, note 13a; also see 3 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed.)
art. 1361, p. 2, where this view would also seem to be substantiated.
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
Mayhap in the presentation of this preliminary analysis, cer-
tain theories and ideas have been presented which may appear
to be refined to the point of repugnancy, but it is submitted that
it is only by reducing a problem to its jesuitical potentialities that
the best compromise between hypothesis and practicality is dis-
coverable.
Thus far we have purposely limited the extent of this discus-
sion to an isolation and rational analysis of the problem as a legal
situation: we shall now proceed to a more particularized consider-
ation of the existing authorities, beginning with an examination
of Professor Wigmore's theory concerning prior inconsistent
statements.
II. PROFESSOR WIGMORE'S THEORY CONCERNING PRIOR
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
Professor Wigmore, after demonstrating irrefutably that the
use of prior self-contradictions to impeach the credibility of a
witness is not obnoxious to the Hearsay Rule,14 goes on to say,
"It does not follow, however, that prior self-contradictions, when
admitted, are to be treated as having no affirmative testimonial
value and that any such credit is to be denied to them in the
mind of the tribunal. The only ground for doing so would be the
Hearsay Rule. But the theory of the Hearsay Rule is that an
extra-judicial statement is rejected because it was made out of
court by an absent person not subject to cross-examination I5 ...
Here, by hypothesis, however, the witness is present and subject
to cross-examination. There is ample opportunity to test him as
to the basis for his former statement. The whole purpose6 of
the Hearsay Rule has already been satisfied. Hence, there is
nothing to prevent the tribunal from giving such testimonial
credit to the extra-judicial statement as it may seem to de-
serve... "I
This succinct quotation represents the complete essence of Pro-
fessor Wigmore's theory concerning prior inconsistent state-
ments. It advances the unequivocal view that the genesis and
application of the so-called "prevailing rule"', was a universal
judicial error, and that prior inconsistent statements, which are
competent and have probative value, are inevitably admissible as
substantive evidence, since, by the very nature of the legal situa-
tion in which they are involved, they possess the requisite ele-
ments of non-hearsay statements, and in no conceivable way could
14 See 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed.) art. 1018 (a), p. 459.
15 Italics supplied.
16 Italics supplied.
17 See 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed.) art. 1018 (b), p. 460.
'
8Discussed infra, under I.
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they be said to be hearsay. At a glance, this seems to be a rather
cursory dismissal of a problem which is as labyrinthine as the
one under discussion. The explanation lies in the perspective.
The problem seems relatively simple to Professor Wigmore be-
cause in its solution he adopted certain other of his own theories
of evidence, which, if once accepted, do obviate all the difficulties
of the problem. These theories relate to the elements of non-
hearsay, and in order to understand the above theory, it is neces-
sary to examine the collateral propositions upon which it rests.
It will be noted that in the above quotation from Wigmore,
certain portions have been italicized. The import of such lan-
guage is that, according to this theory, the Hearsay Rule is satis-
fied when 1) the witness is present in court, and 2) subject to
cross-examination. There is no mention of the oath element which
was propounded infra. This results, no doubt, from the fact that
Professor Wigmore does not think that the oath is a requisite ele-
ment of a non-hearsay statement. No attempt will be made here
to advance a different view on that score; but some examination
will be made of the reasons which support such a thesis, for it
is apparent that if such a view is unimpeachable, and the oath
is not to be considered as a necessary element of non-hearsay
statements, then this obstacle to the admission of prior incon-
sistent statements as substantive evidence is removed.
Concerning the oath Professor Wigmore states: "In the fore-
going (cases) 19... Cross-examination alone is mentioned as the
test required by and involved in the Hearsay Rule. In most in-
stances, however, we find the Oath coupled with Cross-examina-
tion in the definition of the rule"... But it is clear beyond doubt
19 Citing Craig dem. Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea (1743) 17 How. St.
Tr. 1160; Lord Melville's Trial (1806) 29 How. St. Tr. 747; Dysart Peerage
Case (1881) L. R. 6 App. Cas. 503; Coleman v. Southwick (1812) 9 John.
50; Farmer's Bank v. Whitehll (1827) 16 S. & R. 89: U. S. v. Macomb
(1851) 5 McLean 286; Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827)
b. VI, c. I, art. 2.
20 Citing Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown (1716) b. II, c. 46, art 44,
. what a stranger has been heard to say is.. no manner of evidence..
not only because it is not upon oath, but also because the other side hath
no opportunity to cross-examine.": Fabrigas v. Martyn (1733) 20 How. St.
Tr. 135---"Hearsay is no evidence. If they had brought him here, we could
have his evidence on oath and could cross-examine him as to the facts.";
Wright v. Tatham (1837) 7 Ad. and E. 313, 5 Cl. & F. 689-". . The
general rule is that facts are to be proven by testimony of persons on oath
and subject to cross-examination."; Grisham Hotel Co. v. Manning (1867)
Ir. R. 1 C. L. 125--" Statements . . made by persons not upon oath or sub-
ject to cross-examination, would not be exempted from the general rule
excluding hearsay evidence."; Chapman v. Chapman (1817) 2 Conn. 348;
Warren v. Nichols (1843) 6 Mete. 261 "It is the familiar rule of hearsay.
The reasons are obvious, and they are two: first, because the averment of
tlhe fact does not come to the jury sanctioned by the oath of the party on
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
that the oath, as thus referred to, is merely an incidental feature
customarily accompanying Cross-examination, and that cross-ex-
amination is the essential and real test. . . That this is so is
seen by the perfectly well-established rule that a statement made
under oath .. . is nevertheless inadmissible if it has not been
subjected to cross-examination21 . . . Owing to the practice of
requiring an oath.., before proceeding to examination and cross-
examination, the case does not happen to arise of testimony
which has been tested by cross-examination and yet lacks the
oath, so that the tenor of the rule ... cannot be tested by that
situation. But it is sufficiently and clearly demonstrated (as
above quoted) ...; as well as by the further fact that, whenever
an exception to the Hearsay Rule is found established i. e. when-
ever statements not subjected to cross-examination are exception-
ally received, it is not required that they shall have been made
under oath22 .... 23
The italicized portions of this argument furnish the three rea-
sons advanced by Professor Wigmore in support of the view that
the oath is not an essential element of non-hearsay statements.
Let us examine their substance respectively. The first reason is
that the presence of the oath element alone will not be sufficient
without the element of cross-examination. It is submitted that
this reason actually demonstrates only that the cross-examination
element is essential, and is no proof at all that the oath is unes-
sential, for it is pregnant with the possibility that both elements
are essential. The second reason is by way of implied assump-
tion, rather than logic. It states that the theory cannot be tested
by the situation where the cross-examination element is present
and the oath element is lacking, but the implied assumption is
that if such a case were possible, the statements would be non-
hearsay. That this impossible test would be the only completely
sound test is demonstrable: as for the assumption of the con-
clusion of an impossible premise, however authoritative the
source, it is not a test in any sense except the intuitive. The
third reason is that the oath element is not required as to state-
ments admitted under established exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
where cross-examination is not considered essential. This reason
is equally as inadequate as the first two. The "raison d'etre" of
whose knowledge it is supposed to rest; and secondly, because the party
upon whose interests it is brought to bear has no opportunity to cross-
examine him upon whose supposed knowledge and veracity the truth of the
fact depends." (Italics supplied. This is strong statement supporting the
view that the oath is an essential requirement, and not an incidental one.):
Marshall v. R. Co. (1868) 48 Ill. 476.
21 Italics supplied.
22 Italics supplied.
23 See 3 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed.) art. 1302, pp. 4-5.
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the corollary theorems of exception to the Hearsay Rule is that
however numerous and weighty the Rule's requirements ordi-
narily, they should be ignored in favor of the predominant desire
for admissibility in the particular instance. 24 Hence, even if the
oath were postulated as a requisite element of non-hearsay, it
would not be required under the Hearsay Rule's exceptions, be-
cause of the very reason which led to their promulgation. It is
certainly no argument against the possible ordinary essentiality
of the oath element that it is not required as to exceptional state-
ments which are concededly admitted in defiance of the ordinary
requirements of the Hearsay Rule.241 What, then, remains of the
collateral arguments advanced to support the view that the oath
is not an essential element of non-hearsay? It is submitted that
the only advocacy for the view is the intuitive direction of its
propounder, which is still, however, a formidable sanction for
its adoption. The effect of the acceptance of this theory upon the
admissibility of prior inconsistent statements is considerable,
for once the oath is dismissed as a requisite element of non-hear-
say declarations, the lack of that element would in no way affect
the introduction of such statements as substantive proof of the
facts therein contained
It is thought here that the element of cross-examination is, in
reality, not pertinent to a discussion of the admissibility of prior
inconsistent statements. The rationale of this idea is adequately
presented infra, under I. It would not be amiss, however, to
state in addition that those authorities which stress the presence
of the opportunity to cross-examine the declarer of prior incon-
sistent statements as a reason for accepting the statements as
non-hearsay, interpose an unnecessary consideration to the solu-
tion of the problem. It is submitted that the true reason why the
statements are non-hearsay on this score, is that, by hypothesis,
the party entitled to cross-examination has been more than satis-
fied in having elicited from the declaror a direct contradiction of
such statements, which is already admitted as substantive evi-
dence.
The element of non-hearsay which remains to be considered is
the element of confrontation. Professor Wigmore's theory of this
element is as follows :--" . . It is generally agreed that the
process of Confrontation has two purposes, a main and essential
one, and a secondary and subordinate one:
24 See 3 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed.) arts. 1420-22, pp. 153-6.
241 See Tilghman, C. J., in Garwood v. Dennis (1811) 4 Binney 328: "It is
objected that, however impressive the declaration of a man of character
may be, yet the law admits the word of no one in evidence without oath.
The general rule is certainly so; but subject to relaxation in cases of neces-
sity or extreme inconvenience." (cited in 3 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed.)
art. 1420, p. 154.
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1) The main... purpose of confrontation is to secure for the
opponent the opportunity of cross-examination...
2) There is, however, a secondary advantage to be obtained
by the personal appearance of the witness; the judge and the
jury are enabled to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evi-
dence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain
subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness... 25 (This
statement goes on to say that the "demeanor-evidence" may be
dispensed with if necessary.)
It is apparent from this excerpt that Professor Wigmore goes
even further than what has been hereinbefore termed the "theory
of general confrontation," which demands only that the declarer
of a non-hearsay statement be present and testifying in court,
and states that once there has been an opportunity for cross-ex-
amination, the secondary element, or demeanor-evidence, may be
dispensed with if necessary. This further limitation on the
"theory of general confrontation" is irrelevant to a consideration
of prior inconsistent statements, however, since by hypothesis,
the declaror has already testified before the present jury andjudge, and the demeanor evidence is executed. As to this limi-
tation of dispensability, then, Professor Wigmore probably has
reference to situations arising under the exceptions to the Hear-
say Rule, which, following the above explanation, form a distinct
and separable category.
As has been pointed out, if the "theory of general confronta-
tion" is followed the problem of the admissibility of prior incon-
sistent statements as substantive evidence is further simplified,
because, by hypothesis, the witness is present and testifying in
court.2
6
There remains but one further item to be considered. The
writer has been unable to find any direct authority to support the
"theory of special confrontation" advanced infra, and which, it
will be remembered, demands that the particular disputed state-
25 See 3 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed.) art. 1395, pp. 94-7. See Ryland, J.,
in State v. McO'Blemis (1857) 24 Mo. 421---"There are many things aside
from the literal import of the words uttered by the witness while testifying
on which the value of his evidence depends. These it is impossible to trans-
fer to paper. Taken in the aggregate, they constitute a vast moral power in
eliciting the truth, all of which is lost when the examination is had out of
court and the mere words of the witness are reproduced in the form of a
deposition."
26 Where the witness has died since testifying in court and the party
adversely affected wishes to introduce his prior inconsistent statements, the
same general principles as enunciated would govern i. e. if the statement
were made in a deposition taken in the same manner or prior trial it would
probably be admissible under statute. If the statement were made not
subject to cross-examination, it would still be admissible following the theory
that this element is satisfied by hypothesis.
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ment be substantially declared to the present jury in order to
meet the requirements of non-hearsay. On the other hand, there is
apparently no primary authority in point for the proposition that
where a prior inconsistent statement has satisfied the oath and
cross-examination elements of the non-hearsay requirement, it
is nevertheless admissible as substantive evidence, irrespective
of the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, although the statement was
not substantially re-declared to the jury, as where the witness
denied making the statement, or was unable to remember, or in
any other way failed to substantially re-affirm, or where the wit-
ness has died before the prior inconsistent statement was sought
to be introduced. However, there is some possible thread of argu-
ment in favor of the "theory of special confrontation," which will
be presented in the form of a question. What is the purpose of
the requirement that before introducing the prior inconsistent
statement into evidence, even to impeach, the cross-examining
party must first ask the witness whether or not he made the
statement?27 Is it not that where the witness is available and
before statements attributed to him are introduced to impeach
him, he should first be asked, as a matter of justice, whether or
not he made the statements? Can it be maintained that such pro-
cedure should be relaxed when the statements are sought to be
given even greater force by their introduction as substantive evi-
dence? Hardly. Is not the imposition of this precautionary mea-
sure an indication that what the law seeks to do is force the wit-
ness to subitantially re-affirm the statement to the present jury
before allowing it any substantive value, which is the essence of
the "theory of special confrontation"? The fact that where the
witness denies etc., proof that he made the prior inconsistent
statements by other witnesses is only admissible for purposes of
impeachment,2 8 even according to Professor Wigmore's theory,2
strengthens this view. Furthermore, of what value is the esti-
mate of a witness' general credibility gathered from an observ-
ance of his demeanor, to test his credibility as to a particular
statement: the particular testimony might betray some uncer-
tainty, hesitance, or other sanction for disbelief, not at all discov-
erable through an observance of the witness' demeanor while
delivering all of his other testimony. It does not seem too severe
to exact this more specific kind of confrontation.
III. CRITICISM OF THE THEORY AND AUTHORITIES ADVANCED
IN PULITZER V. CHAPMAN
The theory of the court in Pulitzer v. Chapman in respect to
the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements was borrowed
27 Supra, notes 10 and 11.
28 Supra, notes 13a and 13b.
29 Supra, note 13b.
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in its entirety from Wigmore's Evidence. But under the special
facts of the case, the problem was considerably reduced. The dis-
puted statements were made in a deposition" during the same
trial, and hence were made under oath and with an opportunity
for cross-examination, 3' thus disposing of two of the possible ele-
ments of non-hearsay. As to the third, confrontation, the Court,
adopting Professor Wigmore's theory, naturally dismissed it in
short order. Since the original source of the theory has already
been discussed, it is unnecessary to repeat the criticism here.
Before proceeding to an examination of the primary authori-
ties advanced in support of the result in the instant case, some
estimate of the scope of the decision will be made. According to
the facts of the case, the party adversely affected by the introduc-
tion of the prior inconsistent statements allowed the evidence to
be introduced without making any total or limitational objection,
and allowed the trial to proceed to a verdict without requesting
a limitational instruction, although he had such a right according
to the state of the authorities before this decision.3 2 The limi-
tational objection was first made on appeal to the Supreme Court
of Missouri. The objector, at that time, was guilty of laches in
80 The problem, here, was incidentally complicated by a Missouri statute,
R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 1780 (Mo. St. Ann., sec. 1780, p. 4037) which provides
that the testimony of a witness given by deposition in a former trial of a
cause, can only be used at a subsequent trial when the witness is dead,
absent from the jurisdiction, etc. The Court, in admitting the evidence met
the statute with the argument that the deposition of a present witness may
be used to impeach, and ". . . To say such former statements may be con-
sidered as impeaching testimony, but not as substantive evidence is to make
a distinction without a difference." (Pulitzer -v. Chapman, supra, note 1,
1. c. 411) and that ..... a jury could not be expected to comprehend the
difference . . ." (Ibid., 1. c. 411). As to the correctness of this result no
comment is offered.
But the Court, in making this observation, apparently overlooked the fact
that in the particular case it was for the Court to decide, if any distinction
was to be made, since whether or not the order of the trial court was sus-
tainable depended the question of law as to whether the prior inconsistent
statements could be considered as substantive proof. It is submitted that
where the prior inconsistent statements form the sole substantial evidence
on a particular issue, it makes no difference that the jury wouldn't be able
to make the distinction which has been referred to, because the court should
direct a verdict on that issue if the statements are considered inadmissible
as substantive evidence, and seasonable objection is made.
31 8 R. C. L. 1130---"A deposition is sometimes used both in common
parlance and in legislative enactment as anonymous with "affidavit" or
"oath" but in its more technical and appropriate sense, the meaning of the
word is limited to the written testimony of a witness given in the course of
a judicial proceeding at law or in equity, in response to interrogatories
either oral or written, and where an opportunity is given for cross-examina-
tion."
32 Snyder v. Murray (Mo. App. 1929) 17 S. W. (2nd) 639, 645; State v.
Kilgore (1879) 70 Mo. 546, 558. Also see supra, note 8.
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respect to the objection, which raised an issue of waiver of defect
by failure to object seasonably. Concerning this factor, the Court
stated: "The testimony was received without objection... But
in order that we may not be misunderstood, we hold further that
even if an attempt had been made by proponents to limit the
effect of Judge Cave's deposition to mere impeachment, it would
have been futile, and that the parts of the deposition mentioned,
as proven by the witness' admissions,33 were competent as sub-
stantive evidence."34
This statement, strictly speaking, is dictum, since as a matter
of fact such a case was not presented to the Court. But it is
dictum of such a forceful nature that it might well be relied
upon as primary authority in similar cases which may arise in
the future. The Court deliberately avoided deciding the case on
the issue of waiver.
Ordinarily, it might be considered too critical to make a be-
labored examination of the primary authorities relied upon in a
particular decision, but the peculiar nature of the present prob-
lem, and the signal importance of the present case, should excuse
such an investigation here.
Until the enunciation of the present decision, the Missouri
cases followed the "prevailing rule" mentioned herein, 5 with only
one apparent "exception." This "exception" which the Court
leans upon for its solitary primary precedent is Berry v. Pea-
cock Coal & Development Co.,36 where, in an action for personal
injuries the defendant's employee gave testimony at the trial
inconsistent with statements made by him in a deposition taken
before the trial. The deposition itself was offered and received
in evidence without question, and concerning an objection to its
use as substantive proof of the facts contained therein, the Kan-
sas City Court of Appeals stated: "It is said that deposition...
cannot be considered by the jury as a proof of the statements
made therein, but only as affecting the witness' credibility. This,
however, is untenable. The statements were made under oath and
as evidence in this case; they were in a deposition regularly
83 Italics supplied. It is submitted that the word "admissions" here has
reference to the witness' affirmative answer when asked whether he made
the prior inconsistent statement, and is not be construed as the technical
use of the word under the exception to the hearsay rule, described as
"admissions against interest."
34 Pulitzer v. Chapman, supra, note 1, 1. c. 412.
35 Peck v. Ritchie (1877) 66 Mo. 119; State v. Kilgore (1879) 70 Mo. 558;
State v. Hughes (1880) 71 Mo. 635; Fesler v. Hunter (Mo. App. 1931) 35
S. W. (2nd) 641; Staley v. Lawler (1930) 224 Mo. App. 884, 27 S. W.(2nd) 1039; Swift v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. (Mo. App. 1929) 15 S. W.(2nd) 964; Gardner v. Eldridge (1910) 149 Mo. App. 210, 130 S. W. 403;
Shoninger v. Day (1893) 53 Mo. App. 147.
36 (Mo. App. 1923) 253 S. W. 456.
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taken in this case, and the deposition was offered and received in
evidence without objection or limitation in any way."37 This
opinion merely states its conclusion dogmatically without any
express analytical process, or citation of authority. The only
logical inference is that the Court failed to see the existence of a
problem, and reached its result more by intuition than by con-
scious ratiocination. To begin with, the case differs from Pulitzer
v. Chapman in that here the deposition itself was received in
evidence, and it is not clear from the report whether or not the
witness was ever asked whether he made all the statements in
the deposition. Secondly, since the witness in the Berry case
was an employee of the party adversely affected by the introduc-
tion of the deposition, and since no objection was made to its
introduction, it is suggested that the Court might have allowed
the statements to be given probative value on some theory of
vicarious admissions, 8 rather than upon the unprecedented
theory for which the case is cited in Pulitzer v. Chapman. It is
significant in this regard that the Court in that case refers to
the deposition statements in the Berry ease as "admissions made
by the witness in his deposition,"9 whether by design, or inci-
dental ambiguity of phrase. Thirdly, the opinion in the Berry
case fails to discuss the issue raised by the use of a deposition
of a present witness, although a statute identical to the one re-
ferred to in Pulitzer v. Chapman was operative at the time.40
Fourthly, Berry v. Peacock was overruled "sub silentio" by the
case of Snyder v. Murray-1 where the Kansas City Court of Ap-
peals, in an opinion delivered by Judge Bland, held that the prior
inconsistent statements of a defendant's witness (who was also
a co-defendant), contained in his deposition taken during the
trial, and used by the plaintiff for purposes of impeachment,
were not admissible as substantive evidence, the Court expressly
stating: "This testimony was contained in the deposition of
Murray (the witness and co-defendant) 42 used by plaintiff solely
37 Ibid., 1. c. 460.
38 This suggestion results from the very absence of a rationale in the
case under discussion. It is at least questionable whether the Kansas City
Court of Appeals would make such a direct departure from the historic
rule without some explanation. For the theories of adoption and agency
which might have authorized the decision, see: 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd
ed.) art. 1069, p. 552 (general statement) : Ibid, art. 1075, p. 577 (theory of
adoption) : Ibid., art. 1078, p. 586 (theory of agency).
30 Italics supplied. Pulitzer v. Chapman, supra, note 1, 1. c. 412. The
use of this language removes the possibility that the Court meant "ad-
missions" by the witness that he made the disputed statements, as explained
in supra, note 33. It is still, possible, however, that the Court is using the
word "admissions" here as a generality, synonymous with "statements."
40 R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 5467, p. 1748.
4' Supra, note 32, cited with approval in Fesler v. Hunter, supra, note 35.
42 Parenthetical comment supplied.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss2/7
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
for purposes of impeachment, and therefore this testimony
cannot be considered for any other purpose except impeach-
ment... ,43 The evidence, if admissible, was otherwise competent
and had probative value on the main issue in the case, which was
whether or not the one defendant was liable via agency for the
acts of the co-defendant witness which had allegedly contributed
to the plaintiff's injury. Lastly, it must be remembered that in
the Berry case, too, the party objecting to the introduction of the
prior inconsistent statements was guilty of laches in not raising
his objection until appeal. It is very possible that the Court's
decision was based entirely upon this fact. At least, the Court,
in that case did not expressly negative such a construction of its
decision, as was done in Pulitzer v. Chapmon. This forceful
dictum creates a strong inference that the Court was aware of
the latent limitation of the Berry case, but was nevertheless
citing the case for the point which the decision apparently did not
consider. Considering all these factors, it is at least questionable
whether Berry v. Peacock is reliable authority for the decision in
Pulitzer v. Chapman.
The only other case cited here as authority for the result was
United States ex rel. Ng Kee Wong v. Corsi" where, in a pro-
ceeding before a special board of the bureau of immigration, the
"prevailing rule" was termed "an artificial doctrine," and it was
held that a transcript of the earlier sworn inconsistent testimony
of a witness could be received in another case, not only to im-
peach the witness, but also as affirmative proof of the facts stated.
The only difficulty with this citation is that it is authority as well
for the proposition that such administrative boards are not bound
by the common law rules of evidence."
The purpose of this fulsome treatment of the authorities ad-
vanced in Pulitzer v. Chapman has not been, in any sense, a
criticism of the Supreme Court of Missouri, and it is not to be
so considered, but rather, it has been an attempt to show that the
decision in the instant case upon the point of evidence under dis-
cussion, was unprecedented, and that, in reality, the authority for
the proposition enunciated is Professor Wigmore's theory thereof.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the preceding analysis it has been the intention of the writer
to sound the depths of the rule of law that prior inconsistent
statements of a witness are admissible only for the purposes of
impeachment, and to gather together, for the first time, the theory
and primary authority relevant to the application of the rule, in
43
.Supra, note 32, 1. c. 645.
4 (C. C. A. 2, 1933) 65 Fed. (2nd) 564.
45 Ibid., 1. c. 565.
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order to arrive at some rational formula for the solution of any
particular situation which might happen to arise in the future.
It is believed that such a formula is discoverable from a perusal
of this note. But to etch the idea more distinctly, the various
components of the process will be brought together here.
In considering the admissibility of prior inconsistent state-
ments of a witness, the following rationale is suggested. The
tribunal should first consider the rule that prior inconsistent
statements are admissible only to impeach, and should realize
that the rule is only applicable where the statements are hearsay.
The next consideration is whether or not the particular state-
ments are hearsay. If Professor Wigmore's theory is adopted,
it would seem that in no case could such statements be considered
hearsay; but as above noted, that theory is subject to some con-
siderable adverse criticism. At all events, the tribunal should
determine what it believes to be the requisite elements of non-
hearsay, and if the particular statements possess all of those
elements, then the rule should not be applied, and the statements
should be given substantive effect. Where the statements are
admissible under any of the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, it
is submitted that the limitational rule is equally as inapplicable,
since the exceptional rule has a preferential sanction.
Concerning Professor Wigmore's theory, which, if adopted,
would abolish entirely the prevailing rule, the above consideration
has attempted to illustrate that such a theory is extreme in cer-
tain respects. The fact that such an eminent and authoritative
juristic scholar should have entertained, for such a long time, the
idea that the prevailing rule should inevitably apply, 46 and then
swing to the other pole, and advance the theory that the prevail-
ing rule should inevitably not apply,47 is evidence that at least
there are two facets to this legal "gem," and indirectly serves to
suggest that there is possibly a "golden mean" solution, which is
represented by the theory that prior inconsistent statements
which are hearsay, but not subject to any exceptional hearsay
rule, are admissible only for purposes of impeachment: that it
is possible to have prior inconsistent statements which are not
hearsay; and that such statements are admissible as substantive
evidence as well as for purposes of impeachment.
Whether or not the writer has succeeded in establishing this
possible theory is unimportant. It is submitted that the primary
object of the discussion has been to assemble and clarify the
issues raised by the legal situation.
ARTHUR J. BOHN '36.
46 2 Wigmore, Evidence (ist ed. 1904) art. 1018 (b), p. 1180.
47 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed.) art. 1018 (b), p. 460.
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